The paper explains the necessity, for humanoid robots, of the body schema, as a middleware between motor cognition and motor control. A speci¯c model of body schema is described, based on the Passive Motion Paradigm, which uses force¯elds for representing goals and internal/ external constraints. The integration of the body schema with motor control is discussed in relation with whole body movements. Finally, the integration with sensorimotor cognitive processes is addressed, in the context of learning/discovering the use of tools in skilled behavior.
Introduction
In a previous paper [De Santis et al., 2012] we formulated the question of whether humanoid robots need a body schema for carrying out intelligent, skilled behavior. In the human case, the neuronal basis of this concept has been the topic of a number of studies [Holmes and Spence, 2004; Gallagher, 2005] . There is agreement on the distributed nature and the intrinsic multi-sensory and sensorimotor aspects of the body schema concept, in other words, its integrative properties. Moreover, conscious intentions and motor awareness identify another relevant topic for addressing the computational background of the body schema problem. The recent review by Desmurget and Sirigu [2009] is quite illuminating in this respect. They show that the subjective feelings of conscious intention and movement awareness are mediated by a neural sensorimotor network involving the posterior parietal cortex, supplementary motor area and premotor cortex. Intentions to carry out an action are necessary in order to be aware of the action and such motor awareness/conscious intention is likely to use the same cortical circuitry that is responsible for movement planning and control. Thus, consciousness of our movements is not an abstract mental process, separated from acting, but an integral part of the action generation mechanism. This is also con¯rmed by the clinics of neurological disorders: there are indeed many examples of illusion of movement, without movement, or real movement, without awareness of it, and this can be explained in terms of dysfunctions of the parietofrontal circuitry considered above.
Imitation is a form of social interaction related to motor awareness. In particular, Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia [2010] point out that the parieto-frontal \mirror" circuitry is the only mechanism that \allows an individual to understand the action of others from the inside and gives the observer a¯rst-person grasp of the motor goals and intentions of other individuals". In other words, the body schema is a kind of \suit" that can be worn by di®erent owners. Additional inspiration for this line of reasoning comes from experiments on motor imagery. A growing amount of evidence generally supports the idea of common underlying functional networks subserving execution as well as imagination of movements [Lotze et al., 1999; Kranczioch et al., 2009; Munzert et al., 2009] . Neural activation patterns include not only premotor, motor and parietal cortical areas but also subcortical areas of the cerebellum and the basal ganglia. In particular, the presence of activity in the typically motor regions suggests that covert actions are in the same \motor format" that is required by overt actions, with the only di®erence that, during covert actions, descending motor commands are inhibited at some point and rea®erent signals (but not anticipated sensory consequences of planned actions) are missing. In fact, the concurrent activation of descending motor pathways might be involved in the generation of e®erence copies that propagate upstream to parietal and premotor cortex, thus predicting the potential consequences of planned actions.
Jeannerod [2001] went a step forward by formulating the Mental Simulation Theory, which posits that cognitive motor processes such as motor imagery, movement observation, action planning and verbalization share the same representations with motor execution. Jeannerod interprets this brain activity as an internal simulation of a detailed representation of action and uses the term S-state for describing the corresponding time-varying mental states. The crucial point is that since S-states occurring during covert actions are, to a great extent, quite similar to the states occurring during overt actions, then it is not unreasonable to also posit that real, overt actions are the results of the same internal simulation process. Running such internal simulations on an interconnected set of neuronal networks is, in our view, the main function of the body schema. Therefore, the body schema must not be considered as a static structure, like the Pen¯eld's homunculus, but a dynamical system that generates goal-oriented, spatio-temporal, sensorimotor patterns. In agreement with the evidence reviewed above, we may suggest that the distributed neural structure implementing such dynamical process is a set of parieto-frontal circuits.
In humanoid robotics [Ho®mann et al., 2010] , the concept of body schema sometimes is confused with the concept of embodiment, but they are not the same: if you have a body schema you also have embodiment but not the other way around. For example, simple biological organisms, like Aplysia [Kandel and Tauc, 1965] , or arti¯cial organisms, like Braitenberg's Vehicles [Braitenberg, 1986] do not need any body schema and rely on simple reactive neural circuits, connecting sensors to actuators via a few neuronal clusters, thus exploiting the physical or morphological properties of their bodies. Still they exhibit complex, adaptive behaviors. A rationalization of this framework, in the realm of Arti¯cial Intelligence, has been proposed by Brooks [1986] , who developed the subsumption architecture, based on decentralized control, and generalized the concept by proposing the idea of \Intelligence without representation" [Brooks, 1991] .
However, although a purely reactive architecture is quick and e±cient for low levels of complexity, it does not scale up well: with an increasing number of Degrees of Freedom (DoFs) and a richer repertoire of actions, a subsumption architecture would clearly su®er the curse of dimensionality because the number of useful/necessary coordination mechanisms among DoFs or operational modules would inevitably increase exponentially, with increasing di±culty in action selection and potential con°icts between modules.
On the other hand, the explosive growth in the complexity of the body in a limited number of species, culminating in Homo sapiens, is typically concentrated in two body parts (the hand and the vocal tract) that do not have a speci¯c/specialized function from the Darwinian point of view, like the sharp teeth and claws for predators or the long beaks of hummingbirds. The hand and the vocal tract are indeed general-purpose tools (for manipulation and communication, respectively) to be employed in in¯nite numbers of possible manners and purposes. The emergence, in phylogenesis, of such complicated bodily tools implied the parallel evolution of a supporting hardware, capable to deal with an \internal representation" of the complex body, i.e., a body schema.
The critical change in evolution, from a reactive neural architecture to a brain with a clear distinction between central and peripheral neural circuits, is that the quick, causal link between sensory stimuli and motor responses is broken. Actions can be goal-oriented, not necessarily stimulus-oriented and can occur in anticipation of events/stimuli or in learned cycles. Real/overt actions can alternate with covert/ mental actions in order to optimize the chance of success in a game or during social interaction. In general, we suggest that, for an organism with a complex body, acting is not limited to reactive, albeit adaptive, stimulusÀresponse mechanisms. As a consequence, overt actions are just the tip of an iceberg: under the surface is hidden a vast territory of actions without movements (covert actions) which are the essence of motor cognition. In other words, the body schema complex can be considered as a middleware between the hardware related to the dynamics of the body, in its interaction with the environment, and the high-level software that supports abstract representations, memory and reasoning (see Fig. 1 ): in this way, the body schema can be involved at the same time in overt, real actions and covert, mental actions.
In this paper, we review a computational model of the body schema, which was developed over the years [Mohan and Morasso, 2007; Mohan et al., 2009 Mohan et al., , 2011a Mohan et al., , 2011b Mohan et al., 2013] , taking into account the Degrees of Freedom Problem [Bernstein, 1967] and the Equilibrium Point Hypothesis [Feldman, 1966; Bizzi et al., 1992; Feldman and Levin, 1995] , in order to unify the computational background of the di®erent aspects of purposive actions: execution, planning, reasoning, observation, imitation, etc. We review some preliminary examples we investigated in order to understand in which manner the proposed body schema can be \downward integrated" with a dynamic motor controller and/or \upward integrated" with motor cognitive processes.
The Body Schema Model
Summarizing the arguments of the previous section about the logical necessity of the body schema for humans and humanoid robots, we can say that this concept is characterized by the following main features:
(1) somatotopic (in accordance with the well-known cortical layout); (2) dynamic (not static, in order to host internal simulations of actions); (3) force-¯eld based (in agreement with generalized equilibrium-point hypothesis); (4) multi-referential (joint-space/actuator-space/ende®ector-space/tool-space . . .); (5) spatio-temporal (as a synergy generation machine, with terminal attractor dynamics); (6) mass-less (to operate equally in overt and covert actions); (7) action-oriented (non-movement-oriented, de¯ning action as the animation of the body schema); (8) task-oriented and expandable (in order to include the internal representation of tools and constraints); (9) global but con¯gurable (in the sense that each action implicitly recruits all the degrees of freedom but con¯guration is equivalent to a task-dependent pruning). Figure 2 illustrates these points. The graph inside the dotted elliptical contour is the somatotopic (obviously innate) component of the body schema. Outside the contour, there is an ensemble of task-speci¯c components, namely targets, force¯elds, time base generators, constraints, tools, etc. For example, a powerful constraint is the grounding constraint, which allows to isolate parts of the graph, thus limiting the°ow of energy through the network, to the parts which are relevant for a given task, as well as reducing the number of recruited DoFs. Other constraints are the joint limits. By representing goals and constraints in terms of force¯elds, the problem of motor redundancy, namely the dimensionality imbalance between the set of recruited motor variables and the variables that characterize a task, is implicitly solved in the simulation of the con¯gured and situated body schema. PMP (Passive Motion Paradigm) [Mussa Ivaldi et al., 1988] is the process of simulating or animating such internal model, somehow mirroring the parieto-frontal neural networks of the body schema.
For example, in the case of reaching actions with a single arm (see Fig. 3 ) the generic scheme of Fig. 2 is modi¯ed in the following manner: (1) instantiating a target with the corresponding force¯eld; (2) grounding the trunk, in order to isolate the arm from the rest of the body; and (3) linking it to a time-base generator (the À function). The force¯eld (which operates in the hand space by attracting the current position of the hand x H to the target x T ) is mapped into the joint space by the transpose Jacobian matrix of the arm J B ' and then determines a rotation patterns in the arm joint vector via the admittance matrix A; the motion in the joint space is mapped back to the hand space by means of J B , thus closing the synergy formation loop of the PMP network. The gating action of the À function [Zak, 1988] forces the network dynamics to recover equilibrium in the prescribed time. This internal simulation coordinates the redundant DoFs while determining in an implicit manner a bellshaped speed pro¯le of the end-e®ector, typical of human movements [Morasso, 1981] .
In the case of bimanual reaching, namely the task to reach two di®erent targets with the two hands at the same time, the scheme of Fig. 3 is expanded by instantiating two targets (x TL and x TR ), with the corresponding force¯elds (FF L and FF R ), and by gating the two sub-networks (for the left and right arms, respectively) with the same À function (see Fig. 4 ). If we keep, as in Fig. 3 , the grounding constraint on the trunk then the two sub-networks will evolve independently without interaction, although they will both reach the corresponding target at the same time as determined by the common time base generator. However, we may decide to recruit also the trunk in the bimanual action, for example, in order to expand the reachable workspace, and this requires to shift the \ground" from the trunk to the pelvis. In this case, the two force¯elds are propagated into the combined network and all the degrees of freedom are recruited, cooperating for achieving the two concurrent tasks.
An additional example is provided by Fig. 5 , which shows the PMP-based body schema con¯gured in order to coordinate whole body reaching movements during standing. Three sub-networks cooperate in this case (see left panel of Fig. 5 ): (1) a target network, for generating a moving target p T ; (2) a focal network, driven by a Fig. 3 . PMP-based body schema, con¯gured for simple reaching movements, and its PMP implementation. Simulation of the model: evolution of x H , q and À. focal force¯eld FF foc that converges to the moving target; and (3) a postural network, driven by a postural force¯eld FF pos that pushes back the hip (hip strategy) in order to avoid that the projection of the Center of Mass (CoM) on the sagittal plane overcomes a limit of stability X max . J F is the Jacobian matrix of the full body chain (from the foot to the end-e®ector) and J P is the Jacobian matrix of the body segments (from foot to hip) that are involved in the hip stabilization strategy; p is the position of the end-e®ector, p com is the position of the CoM and q is the vector of joint angles.
The focal and postural force¯elds are mapped to the joint space and then added, thus driving the coordinated motion of the overall body schema through the admittance matrix A that weights the degree of participation of the redundant set of DoFs to the common movement. The right panel of Fig. 5 , which shows the results of simulating the body schema, demonstrates that the redundant set of joints is coordinated in such a way to satisfy at the same time the two goals, namely achieving the target and keeping the CoM within the region of stability. For the focal force¯eld, a linear elastic model is su±cient, typical for targeting tasks like the ones illustrated in Figs. 3 and 4. In contrast, a highly nonlinear model is used for the postural¯eld. The postural task is intrinsically di®erent from the focal task: reaching is indeed the main goal of the action and thus the corresponding¯eld must be continuously active throughout the action. The postural task must preserve stability and thus the in°uence of the postural¯eld can be close to negligible if the CoM is in a safe area but must increase very strongly when it approaches the limit of stability.
Moreover, it is important to clarify that the body schema above is massless, in the sense that it only captures the spatio-temporal aspects of the action, not its dynamics. It carries out a function of synergy formation and thus it corresponds to the mental simulation of an action, not the action itself.
Revisiting again the computational nature of the body schema concept, after having illustrated it by means of di®erent examples, we observe that, as a consequence of the multi-referential property of the model, there is a generalized displacement node and a generalized force node in each motor space; Jacobian operators map velocity vectors from higher to lower dimensionality motor spaces (e.g., from joint space to end-e®ector space); transpose Jacobians map force¯elds in the opposite direction; sti®ness or admittance operators link velocity and force nodes. Force¯elds propagate activation throughout the network, animating it and ultimately moving from one equilibrium state to another. In this sense, the body schema has no analogy with a lifeless geographic map but is a living, animated internal body model. The animation of the model via concurrent force¯elds is responsible of the ordinal structure of an action, namely the selection and recruitment of the joint patterns (and ultimately muscle groups, in the case of overt actions) that are functional for carrying out a task. However, this kind of distributed model also requires an independent source of order (responsible of the temporal structure) that forces the myriad elements of the overall system to achieve equilibrium at the same time. This is a problem that characterizes many large-scale, distributed systems, like associative memories. The solution is to drive the system with a suitable broadcasted gating function, in such a way to induce a terminal attractor characteristic in the system [Zak, 1988] . This computational necessity for guaranteeing ordinal and temporal structure in complex biological or arti¯cial organisms is supported, in the human case, by recent behavioral experiments [Kornysheva et al., 2012] that suggest the existence of independent ordinal and temporal structures and advocate a nonlinear multiplicative neural interaction of temporal and ordinal signals in the production of movements. In our body schema, the gating action is provided by a kind of spiking function [Tsuji et al., 1995; Morasso et al., 1997] that is applied to all the sub-networks of the overall model.
Integrating the Body Schema with a Motor Controller:
The Case of Whole-Body Reaching
If the body schema is involved in a real action, not the mere mental simulation of the action, it must be interfaced with a motor controller that ultimately sends commands to the muscles of the human body or the motors of a humanoid robot. Matching a controller to the body schema that is \optimal" for a given task is far from trivial and, in general, it involves adaptation and training. Moreover, di®erent types of controllers may be selected and used according to di®erent control strategies: in other words, no universal control strategy exists that can¯t all possible situations. However, whatever the situation and whatever the control strategy, the same adaptable body schema can be used, con¯guring it to the speci¯c requirements, providing the basic synergy formation function from which the control actions can be derived in a natural way. Let us consider, as an example, the whole-body reaching task already mentioned in Sec. 2. The speci¯c control problem that needs to be addressed, in this case, is the instability of the standing body around the ankle. To a¯rst approximation, the standing body can be assimilated to an inverted pendulum, hinged at the ankle: the toppling torque T g due to gravity is counteracted by the restoring torque T s due to ankle sti®ness and the torque T c determined by a suitable feedback controller. In the human case, for example, muscle sti®ness is insu±cient to counteract the toppling torque and thus the controller has the di±cult task of stabilizing an unstable plant via delayed feedback, which is itself a potential source of instability. In humans, the insu±cient ankle sti®ness [Casadio et al., 2005] is due to the intrinsic mechanical properties of the Achilles tendon [Loram et al., 2004] .
In humanoid robots, this limitation could be obviously overcome by using suitable materials, but a sti®ness stabilization strategy has its severe drawbacks: it simpli¯es the control action but it worsens the overall stability (consider, for example, patients a®ected by Parkinson disease who are much sti®er that normal subjects but unable to respond e®ectively to unexpected disturbances) and can determine dangerous force/ torque peaks during hits or falls. Thus a soft ankle is a kind of biomechanical safety fuse which is appropriate also for humanoid robots. In the human case, it has been proposed that a robust feedback controller at the ankle joint is a simple PD (proportional þ derivative) controller operated in an intermittent way [Asai et al., 2009] . Panel B of Fig. 6 shows the activation/inactivation rule in the phase plane of the inverted pendulum (Á is the di®erence between the nominal tilt angle and the actual, delayed angular value determined via sensory feedback).
In Asai et al. [2009] , it is shown that the intermittent controller is an e®ective and robust mechanism for stabilizing quiet upright standing. The simulation shown in Fig. 6 demonstrates that the controller also works in whole body movements. Panel A of the¯gure shows how the body schema of Fig. 5 , con¯gured for whole-body reaching tasks, is interfaced with the intermittent controller. The two computational modules interact bi-directionally through the four ports of interaction, identi¯ed by the green blocks A, B, C, D. In particular, the reference ankle angle for the intermittent controller is transmitted downward by the PMP network, which also provides information about the variations of the moment of inertia of the inverted pendulum and the bias torque related to the varying reference angle; at the same time, the intermittent controller transmits upward the small oscillations of the ankle around the reference angle in order to modulate the postural force¯eld applied to the hip. Panel C shows the evolution of the inverted pendulum in the phase plane during the wholebody reaching action: the initial sway movements, for a small ankle angle in the initial position, are followed by a transition to the new, larger angle and then by the recovery of bounded stability around that angle. In this manner, the hip stabilization strategy employed by the PMP-based synergy formation block is nicely integrated with the ankle stabilization strategy embodied by the intermittent controller.
In general, the synergy formation action provided by the PMP-based body schema will interact bi-directionally with real-time controllers: the controllers will receive from the body schema reference or equilibrium trajectories of the relevant body parts and indications of the mechanical impedance to be applied in the interaction of body parts with the environment or among themselves; the body schema will receive from the controllers sensorimotor information in order to modulate the internal force¯elds that drive the animation of the body model.
Integrating the Body Schema with Sensorimotor Cognitive Processes:
Learning to Use Tools Di®erent tasks can recruit di®erent body parts, possibly with the addition of manipulated tools. The developed formalism allows a real-time recon¯guration of the network, without the need of ad hoc body models for each task. Thus, the proposed PMP-based body schema is adaptable, in the sense of being able to self-calibrate for modi¯cations of anatomical parameters, and extendable, in the sense of rapidly including internal representation of external tools that a skilled user learns to master. More generally, we can say that cognitive processes, in humans as well as in humanoid robots, are driven by two competing requirements: (1) task-speci¯c compositionality, for tailoring and optimizing action-patterns; and (2) task-independent abstraction, for achieving and storing generalizable knowledge. Both capabilities are essential for intelligent, skilled behavior in a variable, uncertain, ill-posed environment, a situation that has been characterized by the term \muddy" [Weng, 2009] . If an organism relies too much on embodiment, what is also known as morphological computing [Pfeifer and IIda, 2005] , the chances of task-independent abstraction become very limited. The opposite holds if embodiment is somehow abstracted [Shanahan, 2010] . The body schema, as we de¯ned it, can be viewed as a kind of virtual embodiment, which exhibits the crucial, winning feature of being expandable, in such a way to allow the organism to learn the use of tools by integrating them in the body schema itself.
The neurophysiology of tool-use in macaque monkeys [Maravita and Iriki, 2004] has shown that when they learn to use a stick or other \tools" to reach for a distant object, this extended motor capability is followed by changes in speci¯c neural networks that hold an updated map of body shape and posture (the putative \Body Schema" of classical neurology). Although the direct evidence of such features in the human brain is not yet available, there is little doubt that it is there, probably in more sophisticated ways than in the case of monkeys. We suggest that learning to use tools requires a body schema, namely a computational structure with the properties described in this paper. In di®erent situations, an intelligent agent will need a stick-like tool or hook-like tool, which requires abstraction capabilities for detecting the relevant a®ordances and ignoring the irrelevant elements. For example, in a stick-like tool, it is important to evaluate length, rigidity, grasp-ability, etc., whereas the speci¯c shape, color and other features are completely irrelevant and others, like weight, can be ignored, at least in the preliminary phases of training for a skilled tool use.
The availability of an expandable body schema allows three types of learning:
(1) Social interaction, namely action learning through visual observation and/or haptic assistance; (2) Physical interaction, via motor babbling; (3) Mental practice, via motor imagery.
In the following, we examine a few examples of how tools of di®erent complexity can be integrated in the body schema. Figure 7 shows how the network in Fig. 3 can be modi¯ed when it is used for animating reaching movements of the Katana robot [Mohan et al., 2011b] , with the help of grasping the stick-like tool. J B embodies the knowledge about the geometry and mobility of the body that we may assume to be \inate" or at least stored as a long-term procedural memory item. J tool represents the novel geometric transformation. The \muddiness" of the real world means that the agent may not have a priori the precise metric knowledge necessary to derive J tool in an explicit manner. The appropriate action, in order to become expert users of the tool, is to grab it and learn the unknown geometric transformation via physical interaction, namely by babbling movements. Fig. 7 . The Katana robot reaches an object, after grasping a stick-like tool and learning the associated geometric transformation.
Learning through physical interaction
The purpose of these movements is to generate a rich training set of proximal/ distal motor patterns for approximating the unknown geometric transformation, without any metric measurement of the tool shape and dimensions. The Appendix provides an example of how such babbling strategy can be organized.
Learning through social interaction
Although physical interaction via babbling is an e±cient way for extending the body schema with simple tools or objects that can be used in only one or a few ways, in many practical cases, learning by showing, namely social interaction, is much more e±cient because it drastically cuts down on the number of trials the agents would need to perform before \discovering" the best solution.
A teacher can show an agent how to use a tool either via visual demonstration or haptic assistance. Figure 8 shows an example of the latter modality with the iCub robot [Metta et al., 2010] . The teacher demonstrates how a hook-like object can be handled in order to fetch an object. The possibility of haptic assistance is made possible, in this case, by the fact that iCub can operate in a very compliant (\idle") manner, allowing the teacher to transmit his/her intention to the robot in a subsymbolic manner. Of course, this mode of social interaction could be enriched and reinforced by associating the teacher's action with language, thus allowing a more e±cient storage and recall of the experience. After the demo, the robot may abstract general features from the speci¯c object and/or practice for the skilled use of that speci¯c object, including some babbling in order to acquire a robust and precise representation of the new tool.
Tools that require bimanual handling
Sometimes a stick-like tool requires that the agent grabs it with two hands, for example, in order to increase the range of force that can be delivered at the tool-tip. Think of a hoe or a baseball bat for example. In this case, the network of Fig. 7 must be modi¯ed as shown in Fig. 9 . Bimanual handling of rigid objects implies that the overall kinematic chain, which includes the trunk, the two arms and the tool, is closed, thus reducing the e®ective number of DoFs. This means that the movements of the two arms cannot be independent, but must be coordinated in such a way to satisfy the constraint. This problem can be solved by introducing an additional constraint in the body schema, related to the fact that when a stick is grasped¯rmly the distance between the two hands must remain (approximately)¯xed, whatever the position and the orientation of the stick. In the formalism of the body schema, the constraint can be implemented by a nonlinear force¯eld FF constr , which operates on the distance between the two hands (d LR ¼ jx HL À x HR j), and attempts to keep it constant during manipulation of the tool. This force¯eld is superimposed on top of the¯eld FF tool , which attracts the tip of the tool x tool to the designated target x T . The tool's transformation matrix J tool must be learned via babbling and after that it becomes an integral part of the body schema during the speci¯c task of stick handling.
An example of a tool that requires bimanual handling is the toy crane depicted in Fig. 10 . The crane is a kind of wheeled carriage which is operated by handlebars, namely a kind of stick, constrained to move on a horizontal plane. Thus the crane has three degrees of freedom (two translational and one rotational), plus two additional ones for acting on the arm which has a magnetized tip.
Learning to use this tool requires some e®ort as well as physical and social interaction with a teacher. Basically the scheme of Fig. 9 remains valid also in this case but the transformation matrix J tool is harder to learn than in a generic stick-like tool. Thus the teacher will have to indicate where to grab the crane, where and how the magnetized tip could possibly fetch and transport pieces of interest in the workspace, etc. Moreover babbling, which in this case is certainly a playful experience for both the teacher and the robot, will require more attention and skill.
Learning via mental practice
Mental practice can serve two di®erent purposes: (1) to recall and perfect an already learned routine, as occurs in many sport discipline with professional performers; and Fig. 11 . iCub learns to build the tallest stack with a set of objects. (2) to learn an appropriate sequence of actions, for a given goal, cutting down on the number of physical trials. An example of the latter paradigm is for a robot to attempt to build the tallest stack from a set of di®erent objects. Figure 11 illustrates an example of the latter paradigm. The task of the robot is to build the tallest stack with a set of available objects: a large red cube, two parallelepipeds of similar size but di®erent color and a mushroom-like object.
We can assume that before attempting the action illustrated in Fig. 11 , the robot had experiences of playing with similar objects in di®erent combinations and managed to store in an episodic memory [Mohan et al., 2013] experiences of successful and unsuccessful attempts to stack pairs of objects. With such background knowledge, the robot can perform mental simulations of the appropriate sequence of actions in order to cut down on the trials which are necessary before achieving the goal.
Discussion
Let us revisit the concept of body schema from the point of view of embodiment or, more generally, of embodied cognition; this is a position in cognitive science emphasizing the role that the body plays in shaping the mind, suggesting that intelligent behavior emerges out of the interplay between the brain, body and physical environment. This position took shape in the mid-1980s, after two decades of predominance of GOFAI (Good Old Fashioned Arti¯cial Intelligence) which was based on a symbolic approach to the study of intelligent behavior. The new paradigm was markedly sub-symbolic: it even arrived at negating the usefulness of \representation" for intelligent behavior [Brooks, 1986 [Brooks, , 1991 , emphasizing that \the brain has a body" [Chiel and Beer, 1997] in the sense that the brain, body and environment are partners au pair for adaptive behavior, without a prede¯ned hierarchy. However, this view was not shared by everybody, arguing that some form of representation is needed [Pfeifer and Scheier, 1998 ] and, generally, behavior-based paradigms do not really work in areas of higher cognition [Steels, 2003] . In the last decade, there has been an explosion of empirical studies related to \embodied cognition" but, as observed in a recent review [Willems and Francken, 2012] , the state of a®airs in this research domain is characterized by a general lack of specicity of current hypotheses that \can easily lead to an erosion of the embodiment concept".
Our approach to this issue, which underlies the present paper, is mostly empirical and emerges from our struggle to provide the iCub humanoid robot with cognitive capabilities, in order to solve simple tasks is the real world, including a basic understanding of what a tool is and how it can be used in a number of conditions. 1 Generally speaking we agree with the following statements on embodied cognition: (1) cognition is situated, in the sense that it is an online process which takes place in the context of task-relevant sensorimotor information; (2) cognition is timepressured, i.e., it is constrained by the requirements of real-time interaction with the environment, what is also known as \representational bottleneck" (e.g., Brooks, 1991; Pfeifer and Scheier, 1998 , among others); (3) the environment is part of the cognitive system, including both the physical and social environment; and (4) cognition is intrinsically action-oriented and even \o®-line cognition", namely cognition without overt action, is body-based as argued by Lako® and Johnson [1999] , who observed that in most occasions abstract concepts are based on metaphors grounded in bodily experience/activity.
We agree with Brooks [1991] that \the world is its own best model" but we also believe that a humanoid robot, as well as a human being or an anthropomorphic monkey, needs an internal model or representation of its own body or body schema, integrated with the mastered tools that allow him/it to succeed in physical/social interaction. Such body schema does not need to be a faithful biomechanical model, including the¯nest details of°esh and bones. It is just a skeleton or middleware representation where is possible to play plausible spatio-temporal games, required at the same time and formulated in the same language by motor cognition and motor control.
The power of the concept is that a well-trained agent can use it to interpret/ anticipate the actions of other agents or also imagine actions that are physically impossible but crucially important for¯guring out the solution of a di±cult task. In other words, we suggest that a well-developed body schema is a fundamental element for allowing intelligent agents to achieve \creativity" as well as \self-consciousness". where h j is an intermediate variable; z j is the output of the hidden layer; gðÁÞ is a sigmoid nonlinearity; w ij , w jk are the connection weights from input to hidden and hidden to output layer respectively; q i and x k are the inputs and outputs of the ANN. After training, by means of the standard back propagation method, we can extract the Jacobian matrix from the neural network in the following way: 
